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ABSTRACT 
Conflict resolution efforts of nearly seventy years between the 
Negev Bedouin and the State of Israel tend to focus on the main issue 
of disagreement—land ownership and its proof.1 Yet, beyond legal 
aspects of ownership, historical narratives, and culturally different 
values attached to land are used and manipulated in this conflict by 
direct and indirect players.  Territorial conflict often lasts longer than 
the material benefits seem to merit due to added issues of identity and 
attachment, which develop over time.2 Therefore, the legal lens is 
limited in addressing this complex: historic, political, social, economic, 
cultural, and ethnic conflict. Inter-cultural engagement between a 
modern state and a semi-nomadic people challenge the prospects of 
conflict resolution.  This is similarly challenged in other contexts of the 
Middle East, Australia, Canada, and the United States.  Political and 
ideological aspects, along with the factor of time, have further 
entrenched the regional Arab-Israeli conflict.  These factors have 
increased the toll on the entire Negev population and environment—
especially on the Bedouin population. 
The narrative of indigeneity is a recent strategy in this conflict, 
linking the Bedouin struggle with that of First Peoples, Aboriginals, and 
Native Americans.3 This context widens the narrow legal discourse 
currently employed in Israel regarding Bedouin land rights.  However, 
the narrative of indigeneity has not been helpful in resolving this 
conflict.  This context also contributes to prospects of comparative 
research.  As the overall context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict 
unfolds, the question of Bedouin indigeneity can also polarize and 
politicize the conflict—distancing the parties from urgent pragmatic 
compromises.  Therefore, linking the narrative of indigenous people 
                                                          
1.  See Shaul Krakover, Urban settlement program and land dispute resolution: 
The State of Israel versus the Negev Bedouin, 47 GEOJOURNAL, 551, 551-52 (1999), 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007004021598 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
2.  See Ron E. Hassner, The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment 
of Territorial Disputes 31 INT’L SECURITY, 107, 138 
(2006), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137509 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
3.  See Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, Negev Bedouin and 
Indigenous People: A Comparative Review, in SOCIETIES, SOC. INEQUALITIES AND 
MARGINALIZATION: MARGINAL REGIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (Raghubir Chand 
et al. eds., 2017). 
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worldwide is unlikely a productive strategy in addressing the conflict 
of Bedouin land rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bedouin are Israeli citizens of an ethnic minority within the 
larger Palestinian-Arab minority.  Bedouin life and culture have 
transitioned from pastoralism to agriculture over hundreds of years, 
adapting to changing economic, political, and social circumstances.4 
Contemporary aspects of Bedouin society—settlement, education, 
family, and work patterns—reflect both these external and internal 
forces.  These societal aspects form the context for the legal-social 
conflict between the Bedouin and the State of Israel over land rights 
and ownership. 
Conflicts and disputes can be viewed as separate processes, divided 
by the question of perceived negotiability.5 Disputes can be escalated 
to the level of conflict and entrenched through a variety of mechanisms.  
Paradoxically, the quest for justice may pose formidable barriers to 
conflict resolution.  As the gap between positions grows, expecting a 
just solution for either parties’ claims entrenches conflicting narratives 
and reduces the likelihood for pragmatism and compromise.6 The 
passing of time increases group territorial identity and attachment 
through multiple mechanisms and thus furthers conflict entrenchment.7 
Third party involvement is another factor, which could empower the 
parties to resist compromise, potentially reducing prospects for conflict 
resolution.8 
                                                          
4.  See John Shoup, Nomads in Jordan and Syria: Cultural Survival Quarterly 
Magazine (Mar. 1984), https://culturalsurvival.org/publications/ cultural-survival-
quarterly/nomads-jordan-and-syria.html. 
5. See generally John Burton and Frank Dukes, CONFLICT: PRACTICES IN 
MGMT., SETTLEMENT & RESOL. 5-6 (1990). 
6. See Yehudith Auerbach et al., Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, 406 JERUSALEM INST. FOR ISRAEL STUD. 15, 71-72 (2010). 
7. See Ron E. Hassner, The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment 
of Territorial Disputes, 31 INT’L SECURITY 107, 109 (Winter 2006-2007), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137509 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
8. Patrick Regan, Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate 
Conflicts, 3, 23-24 (2002) http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176239 (last visited Oct. 29, 
2018). 
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These three factors: perceptions of justice, the passing of time, and 
third-party involvement, establish the territorial dispute between Israel 
and its Negev Bedouin citizens.  This article analyzes the evolution of 
the territorial dispute between the Negev Bedouin and the State of 
Israel, and its escalation to an entrenched social-political conflict.  This 
conflict extends beyond questions of the legal right of land ownership 
and dominates its discourse and portrayal. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 
The Negev semi-arid desert stretches over 13,000 square 
kilometers, or 4,700 square miles, and encompasses nearly sixty percent 
of Israel’s territory.9 The Negev outlines Israel’s borders with Egypt’s 
Sinai desert to the south, the Gaza strip to the southwest, and Jordan’s 
Arava Valley to the southeast.  The Negev’s northern border extends 
from an area near Gaza on the Mediterranean coast to the shores of the 
Dead Sea. 
The Bedouin geographic origins are in the desert and semi-desert 
regions of the Arabian Peninsula.10 Contemporary Bedouin tribes live 
in North Africa, Iraq, and the Levant.11 Historically, the Bedouin 
engaged in: nomadic herding of goats and camels, light seasonal 
agriculture, taxation of caravans, and tributes collected from non-
Bedouin settlements.12 Their lifestyle as nomadic people depended on 
water conditions and year-round pastoral land and evolved as these 
resources became scarce.13 
Under the Byzantine Empire, permanent settlements of farmers and 
traders along the Negev’s northern semi-arid regions served as a front-
line defense against southern Nabatean tribes.14 Incoming migration of 
Bedouin tribes seeking expanses for livestock cultivation transformed 
                                                          
9. Negev Desert Region, Israel, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Negev. 
10.  See generally id.  
11. Bedouin People, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/Bedouin.  
12.  See id.  
13.  See Yahel et al., supra note 3, at 14. 
14.  See Rehav Rubin, The Romanization of the Negev, Israel: geographical and 
cultural changes in the desert frontier in late antiquity, 23 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 267, 
270-71 (1997). 
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the Negev’s population and economic organization, during the seventh 
century, and the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries.15 Nomadic life 
eliminated permanent settlements, including Beer Sheva.16 
Clinton Bailey’s early anthropological study of the Negev Bedouin 
found that, as nomads, Bedouin have lived in the Negev desert for 
hundreds of years.17 Bailey cites Bedouin oral tradition, which 
describes the continuous migration of tribes displacing older ones.18 
Although these oral traditions portray migration patterns and land 
arrangements, they are unreliable as historical sources to date and map 
the Negev Bedouin’s arrival and landholdings.19 Bailey found that early 
thirteenth and fourteenth century sources name major Bedouin tribes of 
the Negev and Sinai, but these tribes are not found in these areas 
today.20 Yet, a German explorer by the name of Ulrich Jasper Seetzen, 
in 1807, compiled a list of tribes showing “all the major groups present 
at that time were already there by the early nineteenth century. . . .”21 
During the sixteenth through twentieth centuries, under Ottoman 
rule, the Negev Bedouin population significantly increased with the 
incoming of nomadic Bedouins and fellahin from Egypt, as well as 
slaves, or abid, from Sudan.22 Farmers, or fellahin, are a recognized 
sub-population of Bedouins who joined the Bedouin over the years as 
land tenants.23 Rather than “true” Arab Bedouin, the fellahin are viewed 
                                                          
15.  A. Allan Degen, Traditional livestock production among Bedouin in the 
Negev Desert, in INT’L HANDBOOK RES. ON INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 115, 
117 (Léo-Paul Dana & Robert B. Anderson eds., 2007). Islamic conquests contributed 
to this migration in the seventh century, and the Mamluk rule during the thirteenth to 
sixteenth centuries. 
16.  Id. at 117-18. 
17.  See generally Clinton Bailey, Dating the Arrival of the Bedouin Tribes in 
Sinai and the Negev, 28 J. ECON. AND SOC. HIST. ORIENT 20, 46-49 (1985). 
18.  Id. at 24. 
19.  Id. at 25. 
20.  Id. at 22. For historical context, the Crusades occurred during the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. 
21.  Id. at 2. 
22.  A. Allan Degen, Traditional livestock production among Bedouin in the 
Negev Desert, in INT’L HANDBOOK OF RES. ON INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 117 
(Léo-Paul Dana & Robert B. Anderson eds., 2007). 
23.  Id. Fellahin originated from different areas in Gaza, Egypt, and Jordan. 
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as socially and culturally subordinate within Bedouin society, carrying 
out much of the agricultural and other perceived menial labors.24 
II. BEDOUIN SEMI-NOMADISM AND THE QUESTION OF LAND 
A. Bedouin Life Until the Nineteenth Century 
East Asian historiography has romanticized the Bedouin as 
remaining untouched and unchanged by the outside world until the last 
decades: a “world without time” reflecting the unchanging desert 
culture.25 However, this perception of nomadism does not fully 
represent the nature of Bedouin life.  Nomadism is also a means of 
adapting to political and military circumstances, more than merely 
adapting to environmental and economic ones.26 Populations maintain 
nomadic patterns in order to benefit from political and economic 
advantages.  Therefore, over the past hundreds of years, the changing 
circumstances in the Middle East have affected patterns of Bedouin 
life.27 Those continuous Bedouin adaptation patterns were affected by 
coercive circumstances and economically motivated political 
opportunities. 
Until the nineteenth century, the Bedouin lived mainly as nomads 
with only few permanent settlements or structures, excluding 
cemeteries.  Pure traditional Bedouin nomadic way of life began to 
evolve in the nineteenth century with increased privatization of 
Bedouin land and diverse employment reflecting Ottoman and Zionist 
                                                          
24.  Gideon M. Kressel et al., Changes in the Land Usage by the Negev Bedouin 
Since the Mid-19th Century, 28-30 NOMADIC PEOPLES (1991). 
25.  Kurt Goering, Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev, 9 J. PALESTINE STUD. 3 
(1979). 
26.  William Irons, Nomadism as a Political Adaptation: The Case of the Yomut 
Turkmen, 1 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 635 (1974). 
27.  See generally id. at 635-36. Over the past hundreds of years, the Bedouin 
have been under Ottoman, British, and Israeli regimes. 
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/5
Arieli camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:36 AM 
2018] NEGEV BEDOUINS AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL 87 
influences.28 Technological development of new transportation options 
and regional infrastructure reinforced these trends.29 
B. Bedouin Life in the Twentieth Century 
Despite the Negev Bedouin’s prevailing image of nomads and 
shepherds, in the early twentieth century most Negev Bedouin lived a 
semi-nomadic life—defined as movement within a twelve to thirteen-
kilometer radius, based on extended periods of settlement and 
agriculture.30  This evolution of traditional lifestyle became the basis 
for the development of an intricate internal-social system of land 
ownership, grazing rights, and water access.31 Another expression of 
lifestyle adaptation was the ongoing reciprocal relations between the 
Bedouin and urban centers.32 Beer Sheva drew in three of the major 
Negev Bedouin meta-tribes to settle, benefitting from development and 
employment opportunities.33 
Nomads largely view land as a commons—serving all, but owned 
by none.  Adapting to semi-nomadic and sedentary lifestyle, with 
increasing exposure to Western culture, facilitates the development of 
a more direct, tribal, and personal claim to land as a source of wealth 
and marker of identity.  Parallel to deepening settling trends, Falah 
traces Bedouin oral knowledge of a developing internal social system 
of land ownership, grazing rights, and water access.34 However, these 
                                                          
28.  See generally Israel Finkelstein & Avi Perevolotsky, Processes of 
Sedentarization and Nomadization in the History of Sinai and the Negev, BULL. OF 
THE AM. SCHS. OF ORIENTAL RES. 67, 77; see Kressel, supra note 26.  
29.  See generally Mohamed Awad, Settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic 
tribal groups in the Middle East, 79 INT’L  LAB. REV. 25-56 (1959). The Suez Canal 
is one example of a technological development of new transportation options. 
30.  Ghazi Falah, Israeli State Policy towards Bedouin Sedentarization in 
the Negev, 18 J. PALESTINE STUD. 71, 79 (1989).  
31.  See generally id. at 81-88. 
32.  See Emanuel Marx, The Political Economy of Middle Eastern and North 
African Pastoral Nomads, in NOMADIC SOCIETIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA: ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY, 78, 81, 86 (Dawn Chatty ed., 2005). 
33.  See Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, The Negev: Land, Settlement, the 
Bedouin and Ottoman and British Policy 1871–1948, 39 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 
53, 56, 58 (2012). 
34.  See generally Falah, supra note 31, at 81-88. 
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changes were largely unaccompanied by actual registration of land 
ownership. 
C. Land Policy and its Effect on Bedouin Life 
In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans developed a robust policy 
to consolidate control and administration of their empire.35 Under 
the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 instituted an 
unprecedented land registration process designed to facilitate law and 
order as well as boost the empire’s tax base.36 Few Bedouin opted to 
register their lands due to their under-appreciation of written 
documentation of land ownership, as well as their preference to avoid 
taxes.37 Therefore, this law classified much of Bedouin territory in the 
Negev as mewat—state-owned dead or not economically viable land.38 
In 1927, a British report still described the Bedouin as the “untamed 
denizens of the Arabian deserts.”39 However, during the British 
Mandate rule, the price of livestock, especially camels, dropped, further 
reducing Bedouin income from this traditional occupation and 
deepening the trend towards permanent settlement, agriculture, and 
alternative livelihoods.  The cultural change deepened as the British 
established the first formal schools for the Bedouin.40 
Widening and deepening of sedentary trends, together with 
increasing exposure to British and Jewish lifestyle and commerce, 
accelerated Bedouin transition to a monetary economy with a demand 
for new market products.41 New employment opportunities especially 
benefited the Bedouin fellahin, and land tenants, as a means of 
                                                          
35. See Religions – Islam: Ottoman Empire (1301-1922), BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/ottomanempire_1.shtml, (last 
updated Sept. 4, 2009). 
36.  Knowpia, Bedouin, http://www.knowpia.com/pages/Bedouin (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2018).  
37.  Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33. 
38.  Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33, at 55. 
39.  Martin Ira Glassner, The Bedouin of Southern Sinai Under Israeli 
Administration, 64 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 31, 36 (1974). 
40.  Ismael Abu Saad, Towards an Understanding of Minority Education 
in Israel: The Case of the Bedouin Arabs of the Negev, 27 COMP. EDUC. 235, 236 
(1991).   
41.  See generally Marx, supra note 32, at 86. 
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loosening their social and economic subordinating ties to the Bedouins, 
thus decreasing the phenomenon of land tenancy.42 
Moreover, the Bedouin lifestyle and traditional land arrangements 
continued to challenge British Mandate authorities, laws, and 
bureaucracy.43 This is reflected in the British Land Order of 1921, 
which stipulated that anyone who cultivated mewat land had to register 
the land within two months to claim ownership.44 Again, Bedouin did 
not take advantage of this opportunity, reflecting their traditional 
perceptions of land, ignorance regarding the significance of British 
bureaucracy, and preference to avoid paying taxes. 
III. ISRAEL AND THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 
During the 1948 War of Independence and the military rule 
imposed on Israeli Arabs in 1951, about 80,000 of the estimated 90,000 
Negev Bedouin fled or were evicted, although many eventually 
returned.45 Israeli authorities transferred two-thirds of the remaining 
Bedouin into the Siyag—a closed reservation under military 
supervision east of Beer Sheva, encompassing just 10% of the original 
size of Bedouin land.46 Legal restrictions such as the Black Goat Law 
of 1950, prohibited the grazing of goats outside recognized land 
holdings in the name of preventing land erosion.47 Conditions in this 
demarcated, closed, and isolated area are reminiscent of the native 
reservations in the United States.48 
The Negev was seen by Israel as an integral part of the country and 
needed frontier for future Jewish immigrant settlement and 
                                                          
42.  See Gideon M. Kressel et al., Changes in the Land Usage by the Negev 
Bedouin Since the Mid-19th Century. The Intra-Tribal Perspective, 28 NOMADIC 
PEOPLES 28, 28 (1991). 
43.  See Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33, at 77. 
44.  See Ahmad Amara, The Negev land question: between denial and 
recognition, Vol. XLII, No. 4 J. PALESTINE STUD. 27, 33 (Summer 2013). 
45.  Deborah F. Shmueli & Rassem Khamaisi, Bedouin Communities in the 
Negev, 77.2 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 109, 111 (Apr. 2011). 
46.  Chanina Porat, Israel’s Policy on the Bedouin Issue and Left-Wing 
Alternatives, 1953-1960, 10 IYYUNIM BITKUMAT ISRAEL 420, 421 (2000) (on file with 
author). 
47.  See Shmueli & Khamaisi, supra note 45, at 110-11. 
48.  SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL 
GOVERNMENT POL’Y TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 11 (2006). 
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development.49 Harsh restrictions of the Negev Bedouin reflected 
historical circumstances of war, in which many Negev Bedouin aligned 
with and supported Arab forces opposing Israel.50 For these reasons 
Israel perceived the Bedouin as a potential threat, warranting prevention 
of Bedouin return and limiting their movement.  In reality, the Negev 
was a border-military zone, which was the scene of frequent military 
clashes in Israel’s early years.  In fact, doubts about Israel’s sovereignty 
over the Negev did not cease until after the 1956 war.51 
A. Bedouin Citizenship and Land Registry 
The Bedouin were granted Israeli citizenship in 1954.52 However, 
just as the Ottoman and British before, Israeli law and policy struggled 
to address Bedouin civic rights, lifestyle as semi-nomads, claims to 
land, and social and economic needs. 
Israel’s land registry relies mainly on Ottoman land registry deeds, 
or nesah tabu.53 The 1858 Ottoman Land regulations formed the basis 
for Israel’s land policy and laws—as it did for the British Mandate.54 
Most Bedouin land holdings were classified as mewat land and these 
were registered as belonging to the state under both Ottoman and British 
law.55 Consequently, the Israeli “Land Law” of 1959, and Land Rights 
Settlement Ordinance of 1969, nullified Ottoman laws and categorized 
all mewat land as Israeli government land.56 
In the early years of the State of Israel, beyond the issue of land 
holdings, a distinct cultural gap was reflected in the patronizing 
attitudes and policies of the Ashkenzi—European leaders of the new 
                                                          
49.  See Shmueli & Khamaisi, supra note 45, at 111-12. 
50.  See generally Havatzelet Yahel & Ruth Kark, Israel Negev Bedouin during 
the 1948 War: Departure and Return, ISRAEL AFF., 21(1), 48, 61-70 (2015). 
51.  Porat, supra note 46 (on file with author). 
52.  Thabet Abu Ras, The Arab Bedouin and their Lands in the Naqab – The 
Tribal Dimension of Steadfastness, 93 ADALAH’S NEWSLETTER 1, 1 (2012). 
53.  Ottoman Land Registration Law as a Contributing Factor in the Israeli-
Arab Conflict, BEKI CONGREGATION (2003), http://www.beki.org/ 
dvartorah/landlaw/. 
54.  See generally id. 
55.  See id. 
56.  See Yahel, H., Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin and Israel, 2 
ISRAEL STUD., 1, 11 (2006); SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 13-15. 
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state regarding the Bedouin population.57 Bedouin life was perceived 
as unproductive and outdated; the Bedouin as an ultimate “other” who 
can be transferred and molded to serve the state’s needs.  This is 
reflected in a famous quote of Moshe Dayan: 
We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat in 
industry, services, construction, and agriculture. 88% of the Israeli 
population are not farmers, let the Bedouins be like them . . . . The 
Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become 
an urban person who comes home in the afternoon and puts his 
slippers on . . . . The children will go to school with their hair 
properly combed.  This will be a revolution, but it will be fixed within 
two generations. Without coercion but with governmental 
direction . . . this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear.58 
Israel consistently views the semi-nomadic lifestyle as inhibiting 
modern development.59 However, behind the administrative 
convenience of settling the Bedouin, Israel has long felt threatened by 
Bedouin history and lifestyle due to its ramifications in terms of land 
holdings and the prospects for Zionist visions of developing the 
Negev.60 
B. Planned and Unrecognized Bedouin Settlements 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Israel executed an urbanization policy, 
declaring to modernize and benefit the Bedouin population, while 
implementing the transformative vision of Moshe Dayan regarding 
Bedouin lifestyle.61 Moreover, an underlying motivation to settle the 
Bedouin in townships was to put an end to Bedouin claims of land 
                                                          
57.  See Harry Oster & Karl Skorecki, The population genetics of the Jewish 
people, 132 HUM. GENETICS 119, 119-20 (2012). 
58.  See Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, Peddling the Myth of the Bedouin ‘Take-
over,’ Haaretz (July 1, 2013), https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-jillian-
kestler-myth-of-the-bedouin-take-over-1.5289626. 
59.  Kark & Frantzman, supra note 33, at 77. 
60.  See generally Talia Berman-Kishony, Bedouin urbanization legal policies 
in Israel and Jordan: similar goals, contrasting strategies, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., 393, 393-94 (2008). 
61.  See generally Thabet Abu Ras, The Arab-Bedouin Population in the Negev: 
Transformation in an Era of Urbanization, in The Arab-Bedouin population in the 
Negev 67, 99 (Maya Popper ed., 2012). 
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ownership rights.  After 1948, the Bedouin land ownership rights, over 
most of the Siyag-area lands, were transferred and handed over to 
Israel.62 Seven Bedouin townships were established offering houses 
and infrastructure in exchange for the renunciation of ancestral land: 
Rahat, Tel-Sheva, Arara, Kseife, Hura, Laqiya, and Segev Shalom.  
Significant resources were invested in these towns and Bedouin 
residents were registered as owners of their subsidized houses and 
specific plots of land.  The seven towns offered modern services: 
schools, health clinics, water, and electricity, but lacked infrastructure 
for local employment and economic development.63 
The Bedouin were not included in the planning of their future 
homes and communities nor were their preferences or traditional ways 
of life considered in this urbanization policy, resulting in significant 
inter-generational and tribal social conflict.64 Initially, the dominant 
population of the townships was the fellahin-Bedouin population, who 
had fewer land claims and therefore seized the opportunities of 
economic independence and release from the Bedouin.  This further 
decreased the towns’ attraction to non-fellahin Bedouin and inevitably 
contributed to inner-Bedouin social conflict regarding prospects of 
permanent settlement.65 
In 2009, 192,800 Negev Bedouin encompassed twenty-seven 
percent of the Negev’s population.66 Nearly two-thirds of the Bedouin 
population eventually moved into the seven townships.67 The 
remaining third live in diaspora localities.68  These localities are often 
referred to as “unrecognized villages,” which are informal communities 
not officially recognized by the government and considered illegal.69 
Their illegal status stems both from their unrecognized land ownership 
                                                          
62.  SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 17. 
63.  See Emanuel Marx & Avinoam Meir, Land, towns and planning: The Negev 
Bedouin and the State of Israel 25 GEOGRAPHY RES. F., 43, 50 (2005). 
64.  Id. at 53. 
65.  See Shlomit Tamari et al., Urban tribalism: Negotiating form, function and 
social milieu in Bedouin 
towns, Israel, CITY, TERRITORY AND ARCHITECTURE 1, 7 (2016). 
66.  ARIK RUDNITZKY, THE BEDOUIN POPULATION OF THE NEGEV: SOC., 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECON. FACTORS 8 (Maya Popper ed., 2012). 
67.  Id. at 9. 
68.  Id. at 11. 
69.  Id. at 11-12. 
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claims and from the classification of these village lands as agricultural, 
not residential.  Because these villages are considered illegal, they have 
few public services or legal permanent structures. 
The Bedouin of the unrecognized villages believe resisting 
resettlement is a strategy to safeguard both land-claims and the Bedouin 
culture and way of life.  An additional incentive to remain in these 
villages is the unlimited “free” land.  The Bedouins perceive the land 
as free because there are no building permit requirements, nor are there 
municipal or national taxes.70 Common belief among Bedouin, which 
has proven to be true, is that residents of these unrecognized villages 
ultimately receive higher state compensation for resettlement options—
if and when resettlement is agreed upon.71 
These unplanned and unrecognized Bedouin villages pose multiple 
challenges to Israel’s executive agencies: education, health, fire, law 
enforcement, and environment.  Israel has not successfully overcome 
the challenge of how to develop desperately needed infrastructure like 
roads, schools, and clinics.72 This infrastructure is necessary to provide 
basic services to its Bedouin citizens and maintain law and safety in 
their villages, which are not zoned for development and therefore have 
no master plans for such infrastructure.73 This partially explains the 
notoriously high rates of Bedouin infant mortality, accidents, crime, and 
irregular school attendance.74 
C. Bedouin Social Circumstances 
Both unrecognized Bedouin villages and their planned townships 
are classified at the lowest level of social-economic development, 
suffering from poor infrastructure, few industrial areas, poor education 
services, and comparatively high crime rates.  Most Bedouin are 
employed outside the Bedouin townships and there is a growing 
Bedouin student population in Israel’s universities, especially Ben-
Gurion University of Beer Sheva.75 However, the Bedouin are hardly 
                                                          
70.  Yahel, supra note 56, at 8. 
71.  Berman-Kishony, supra note 60, at 400. 
72.  See id. 
73.  Abu Ras, supra note 61, at 117. 
74.  Id. at 52, 87. 
75.  SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 17. 
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integrated into the social fabric of their neighboring Jewish kibbutz, 
moshav, and towns, all of whom enjoy state service provision at 
significantly higher standards.76 This estrangement is an expression of 
Israel’s widespread perception of Bedouin as a distinct “other”—Arab 
Muslims who until recently were primitive nomads. 
The Israeli media’s frequent association of Bedouin with crime in 
the Negev has exacerbated this social distance.  Indeed many Israelis 
believe that Bedouins have strategically constructed unrecognized 
villages as a way to gain land in the ongoing Arab-Israeli territorial 
conflict.  However, Israeli policies further this association with 
illegality by issuing nearly 700 annual demolition warrants without 
nearly enough permits for legal construction.77 
IV. BEDOUIN TERRITORY CLAIMS AND CONFLICT 
From 1971 to 1979, Israel initiated a land registration program 
through which 3,220 Bedouins submitted claims of territorial 
ownership encompassing 776,585 square dunam of Negev land.78 
However, nearly 3,000 of these claims are still open, reflecting 
conflicting ownership claims regarding 571,285 square dunam of 
Negev land.79 Since the 1975 Albeck Committee, Israel implemented a 
policy to encourage the Bedouin to settle and compromise territorial 
claims, because of the Bedouin’s lack of legal land ownership 
documentation.  In recognition of the strong Bedouin attachment to 
their land, Israel has offered monetary compensation, “beyond the letter 
of the law.”80 Accordingly, those Negev Bedouin who withdraw 
ownership claims can be eligible for monetary compensation and land 
                                                          
76.  See generally Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, Israel: Bedouin ‘betrayed’ by 
relocation plan, AL JAZEERA, July 31, 2016, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/israel-bedouin-betrayed-relocation-plan-
160731085348670.html. A moshav is a cooperative village, typically with eighty to a 
hundred families. A kibbutz is a commune with one hundred to eight hundred 
members. These are the two main forms of farm cooperatives in the region. Close to 
eighty percent of the agricultural output of Israel is produced on these types of 
cooperative farms. 
77.  See Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel, 
30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 246-47 (1996). 
78.  See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 19. 
79.  See id.  
80.  Id. at 20-21. 
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/5
Arieli camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:36 AM 
2018] NEGEV BEDOUINS AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL 95 
compensation, without need to prove their claim’s validity.81 The land 
compensation is usually between twenty and thirty percent of the full 
claim—for claims of more than 400,000 square meters.82 For the rest 
of the claim, monetary compensation is offered.  None of the Negev 
Bedouin who pursued the legal process have been successful. 
The Bedouin continue to regard approximately 600 square 
kilometers of the Negev as their rightful inheritance and continuously 
petition the government for its return.83 Numerous claims committees 
were established to resolve land disputes, but so far there has been no 
success in bridging the gaps between the Bedouin and the Israeli 
authorities.  Although not all Bedouin claim land ownership, this issue 
affects the entire discourse between the Bedouin community and the 
state. 
The Albeck Committee established dependence between 
relinquishment of land claims and prospects of Bedouin resettlement 
into government-planned localities.84 However, the Bedouin remain the 
poorest and most marginalized sector in Israel’s society as evidenced 
by their education, health, and welfare.85 This policy results in a 
problematic link between the land dispute and Bedouin welfare—
especially in the unrecognized villages—due to lack of government 
investment in basic infrastructure and services.86 
A. Israel’s Policy Change 
Current Israeli policy de-links social-economic policy from land 
regulation.  There is no longer a demand for Bedouin to give up any 
                                                          
81.  Id. at 21. 
82.  See id. at 21-22.  
83.  See generally Amira Hoss, Once Again, Israel Denies the Bedouin What it 
Grants the Settlers, HAARETZ, July 27, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-once-again-israel-denies-the-bedouin-what-it-grants-the-settlers-
1.6317363.  
84.  Noa Kram, The Naqab Bedouins: Legal Struggles for Land Ownership 
Rights in Israel, in INDIGENOUS INJUSTICE: HUM. RTS. L. AND BEDOUIN ARABS IN 
THE NAQAB/NEGEV 147 (Ahmad Amara et al., 2012). 
85.  Mohammad Darawshe & Amnon Be’eri-Sulitzeanu, Introduction to THE 
BEDOUIN POPULATION OF THE NEGEV III, III-IV (2012). 
86.  See generally Shaul Krakover, Urban settlement program and land dispute 
resolution: The State of Israel versus the Negev Bedouin, 47 GEOJOURNAL 551-61 
(Jan. 1999). 
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claims to ancestral land ownership in return for land and money for 
settlement.87 This was recognized as counter-productive in dealing with 
expansion of the Bedouin dispersal.88 Policies such as the Sharon Plan 
allocate funding towards law enforcement rather than urban-town 
settlement.89 Thus, nine of the previously unrecognized villages were 
officially recognized and incorporated into the Abu Basma Regional 
Council, allowing service and infrastructure development.90 
In 2017, Israel approved a Five Year Plan and allocated 3.2 billion 
Israeli New Shekel (NIS), equivalent to one billion U.S. dollars, for 
investment in the neglected developmental needs of the Bedouin 
population.91 However, land claims will likely still need to be resolved 
for housing development and infrastructure to proceed, because the land 
in dispute often lays within or adjacent to Bedouin townships and 
villages.  Therefore, the Bedouin would have the power to block the 
government’s plan for potential growth, unless the land claims were 
settled. 
B. Conflict’s Effect on Discourse 
Despite the increased focus on infrastructure needs, the conflict 
over land rights continues to dominate the discourse between Israel and 
its Bedouin citizens.  The Bedouin Regional Council of Unrecognized 
Villages (RCUV) believes that recognizing eight formerly 
unrecognized villages came at the cost of renouncing significant land 
claims.92 Furthermore, RCUV foresees that the remaining 
unrecognized villages will become urban ghettos neglected by the 
                                                          
87.  See generally Kram, supra note 84, at 79. 
88.  Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of 
the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in 
this context on her mission to Israel and to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (30 
Jan.–12 Feb. 2012) 8 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUM. RTS. (2012), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/iopt0308/iopt0308webwcover 
.pdf. 
89.  Kram, supra note 84, at 49. 
90.  SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL 
GOVERNMENT POL’Y TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2006). 
91.  Five Year Plan for Socioeconomic Development in the Negev Bedouin 
Localities 2017-2021 (Socio-Economic Development Department et al. 2017), 
http://iataskforce.org/sites/default/files/event/pdf-343.pdf. 
92.  SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 48, at 25. 
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government.93 Therefore, the RCUV demands Israel to recognize all 
unrecognized villages and their land claims.94 
Israel increasingly penalizes Bedouin of the unrecognized villages 
to counter any benefits of refusing resettlement and to protect its 
perceived state-land rights.  These penalties—state-led legal counter-
claims, house demolitions, and crop destruction—have intensified the 
Bedouin resistance and their mistrust of the Israeli government, police, 
and justice system.95 Another result of Israel’s penalties has led to 
political and religious radicalization of the Bedouin, reflected in: the 
Islamic movement’s rapid growth, frequent protests, and decreasing 
numbers of Bedouin volunteers enlisting in the Israeli army. 
This territorial dispute has significant social manifestations and 
ramifications.  Within Israeli society, Bedouin of unrecognized villages 
are often portrayed as squatters, who illegally use land without 
limitations of bureaucracy, building permits, or taxation.  Bedouin of 
unrecognized villages essentially intimidate official state 
representatives, including the police, from enforcing law.  There is 
growing public demand within both Jewish and Bedouin populations 
for equal enforcement of law and planning regulations on all citizens—
including the Bedouin. 
Support and encouragement for remaining in the unrecognized 
villages comes both from inside and outside the Bedouin community.  
Activists and non-governmental organizations empower Bedouin 
unrecognized and illegal settlements, sharing the belief that these 
settlements are justified and the authorities should accept the Bedouin 
demand to remain and retain their land ownership.  Others essentially 
link this territorial dispute to the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  A 
relatively recent trend is the self-identification of Bedouins as 
Palestinians, despite documented historic rivalries between the two 
                                                          
93.  Jana Van Breckel, Reclaiming spatial justice for the native Naqab Arab 
Bedouin: Towards a critical geography of the Israeli land and planning laws (2016). 
The Israeli government’s neglect of these unrecognized villages manifest itself 
through limited borders that are inadequate for future growth, and with only minimal 
state investment in long denied services and infrastructure. 
94.  See Maha Qupty, Bedouin Unrecognized Villages of the Negev, HABITAT 
INT’L COALITION (Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.hic-gs.org/ document.php?pid=2670.  
95.  Berman-Kishony, supra note 60, at 402-03. 
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groups.96 In this vein, “the Naqab Palestinian Bedouin [] have shown 
the tenacity typical of the Palestinian people to withstand efforts to 
remove them from their land . . . .”97 In this discourse, Israel is depicted 
as a colonial power that displaces indigenous peoples—both Bedouin 
and Palestinians.98 
V. BEDOUIN AS INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
A cornerstone of indigenous peoples’ claims to land is their right to 
use and/or own their traditional territories.  Different definitions of 
indigeneity offer a mix of objective criteria, such as historical 
continuity, as well as subjective ones, such as self-definition.99 Three 
features are common to most perceptions of indigeneity: “(i) indigenous 
peoples are descendants of the original inhabitants of territories since 
colonised [sic] by foreigners . . . ; (ii) they have distinct cultures, which 
set them apart from the dominant society; and (iii) they have a strong 
sense of self-identity.”100 
Bedouin self-identity is unique—a Palestinian community of 
Arabic-speaking people, with a unique dialect, and roots in the Negev 
stemming over a millennium.  “Some demographers have concluded 
that most of the Bedouin migrated into the Negev from the Sinai Desert 
in the course of [the last] 250 years (i.e., [between the] 16th-19th 
Centuries, . . . )”101 hence weakening Bedouin claims for recognition as 
indigenous to Israel.  The Ottoman Empire’s tax records of the 16th 
century show that tribes living in the Negev, at the time, “are not those 
                                                          
96.  Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, Negev Bedouin and 
Indigenous People: A Comparative Review in SOCIETIES, SOC. INEQUALITIES AND 
MARGINALIZATION: MARGINAL REGIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (Raghubir Chand 
et al. eds., 2017). 
97.  INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFS, THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 2009, 
427 (Kathrin Wessendorf ed., Apr. 2009). 
98.  See ALEXANDRE KEDAR, ET AL., EMPTIED LANDS: A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 
OF BEDOUIN RTS. IN THE NEGEV 8-9 (Stanford University Press 2018). 
99.  See id. at 159. 
100.  Jérémie Gilbert, Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to 
Nomadic Peoples’ Land Rights. 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 681, 694 (2007). 
101.  ADA KATSAP & FREDERICK L. SILVERMAN, ETHNOMATHEMATICS OF 
NEGEV BEDOUINS’ EXISTENCE IN FORMS, SYMBOLS, AND GEOMETRIC PATTERNS 19 
(2016). 
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residing there today.”102 Thus, the contemporary Bedouin population of 
Israel has relatively recent tenure and attachment rather than historic 
ownership rights to Negev land, based on 200 to 300 years of tenure 
and settlement.  In Israel, the relatively recent introduction of the claim 
of indigenousness is usually accompanied by the presentation of the 
Bedouin as a dispossessed people.103 This developing discourse 
demonstrates Hassner’s insight regarding the effect of the passing of 
time in unresolved conflict.  Time affects territorial conflict materially 
by clarifying the boundaries of the disputed territory and symbolically 
by strengthening the social perception of the territory’s integrity and 
value.104 
Indigenous claims are usually accompanied by the accusation of 
dispossession.  To present the Bedouin as a dispossessed people, 
activists and their supporters make two main claims: (1) the Negev 
belonged to the Bedouin for centuries before the founding of Israel; and 
(2) the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, as the historical rulers, 
both recognized Bedouin traditional historic ownership of Negev land.  
According to this accusation, Israel chooses to ignore these legal rights, 
effectively dispossessing the land’s indigenous population in favor of 
Zionist ideals and settlement.105 
The indigeneity of the Bedouin has been met with a certain amount 
of international success, gaining official recognition from United 
Nations’ institutions and the European Union.  Both entities have 
effectively made declarations claiming that the Israeli Bedouin deserve 
the defense of international law regarding the rights of indigenous 
peoples.  In July 2012, for example, the European 
Parliament called ”for the protection of the Bedouin communities of the 
West Bank and in the Negev, and for their rights to be fully respected 
by the Israeli authorities, and condemns any violations.”106 These 
violations include house demolitions, forced displacements, and public 
                                                          
102.  Yahel, Kark & Frantzman, supra note 96, at 14. 
103.  See, e.g., id. at 1, 11, 12. 
104.  Ron E. Hassner, The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of 
Territorial Disputes, INT’L SECURITY, 107-38 (Winter 2006-2007), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137509. 
105.  See generally ALEXANDRE KEDAR ET AL., EMPTIED LANDS: A LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHY OF BEDOUIN RTS. IN THE NEGEV (2018). 
106.  2013 O.J. (C 349E) 87 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2013:349E:FULL&from=EN. 
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service limitations.107 The European Parliament also called on the 
Israeli government to withdraw the Prawer Plan, the 2011 Bill on the 
Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev.108 The Prawer Plan 
combines economic development and integration of the Negev Bedouin 
with the resolution of their land claims, recognizing and expanding 
some unrecognized villages and relocating approximately 40,000 
Bedouin to existing, recognized local councils.109 
However, the claim of indigeneity works both ways.  As opposed 
to the view of Israel as a colonial state, Zionist ideology—through 
which the State of Israel was founded and settled— views the Jewish 
people as indigenous to the Land of Israel.  This ideology is based on 
ancient Jewish settlement and kingdoms, continuous Jewish presence 
in the land, and religious attachment.  Foreign intervention on behalf of 
the Bedouin is perceived as a political tactic, which uses the Bedouin 
for the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.  This foreign intervention disregards 
specific context and legalities to weaken the historic and moral basis of 
the State of Israel.  Thus, many Western states are perceived as 
hypocritical for insisting on the rule of law and contemporary treatment 
of indigenous peoples and minorities, in comparison to many Western 
states’ own colonial histories. 
CONCLUSION 
Bedouin life and culture have transitioned from pastoralism to 
agriculture over hundreds of years, influenced by gradual adaptation to 
changing economic and social circumstances as well as by political 
                                                          
107.  Id. 
108.  Jack Khoury, European Parliament Condemns Israel’s Policy Toward 
Bedouin Population, HAARETZ (July 8, 2012, 4:43 PM), 
https://www.haaretz.com/european-parliament-condemns-israel-s-bedouin-policy-
1.5265139; Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, Israel’s Bedouin Battle Displacement, AL 
JAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/ 
2013828125945288209.html. 
109.  See The Bill on the Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev 
(“Prawer-Begin Plan”), INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON ISRAELI ARAB ISSUES (July 
2013), http://iataskforce.org/sites/default/files/resource/resource-1058.pdf; see 
Martin Michaels, Homeless In Their Own Land: 40,000 Bedouin Face Forced 
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coercion.110 Trends in Bedouin society—settlement, education, family, 
and work patterns—reflect both these external and internal forces.  
Cultural, social, and legal disparities linger when lifestyles evolve and 
are often a basis for conflict—as in the case of the Bedouin and the State 
of Israel. 
The question of indigeneity is a central historic-ideological debate.  
However, the question of Bedouin indigeneity polarizes and politicizes 
this conflict, distancing the parties from urgent pragmatic compromises.  
Heightened political conflict is known to produce polarization at the 
extremes,111 yet this can be enough to divert the mainstream discourse 
from pragmatic compromise to hardened positions.  One certain thing 
we can learn from the context of indigeneity in countries such as 
Canada and Australia is that indigenous people may win territorial 
disputes, but the territory alone is not enough to improve their social-
economic prospects.112 An integrated effort combining the resolution 
of territorial disputes with government planning and investment in 
infrastructure, services, and social integration is needed to fix inequities 
that have developed over decades. 
Berman-Kishony adds a regional dimension to this debate, 
recommending that Israel learn from Jordan in addressing this complex 
conflict.113 Despite the different circumstances, Jordan and Israel share 
ambitions of modern and Western-oriented urbanization and 
development.  These Western-oriented ambitions are often viewed as 
                                                          
110.  See generally Gideon M. Kressel et al., Changes in the Land Usage by the 
Negev Bedouin Since the Mid-19th Century, 28 NOMADIC PEOPLES 28-55 (1991); see 
Seth J. Frantzman  & Ruth Kark, Bedouin Settlement in Late Ottoman and British 
Mandatory Palestine: Influence on the Cultural and Environmental Landscape, 1870-
1948, NEW MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. (New Middle Eastern Studies, June 15, 2011), 
http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/NMES2011FrantzmanKark.pdf. 
111.  María José Hierro & Aina Gallego, Identities in Between: Political 
Conflict and Ethnonational Identities in Multicultural States, 62 J. CONFLICT RESOL., 
1314, 1332 (2018). 
112.  See Francis Mitrou et al. Gaps in Indigenous Disadvantage Not Closing: 
A Census Cohort Study of Social Determinants of Health in Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand from 1981-2006, BMC PUB. HEALTH (Feb. 2014), 
https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-14-20. 
113.  Talia Berman-Kishony, Bedouin Urbanization Legal Policies in Israel 
and Jordan: Similar Goals, Contrasting Strategies, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., 393-412 (2008). 
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incompatible with local Bedouin lifestyle and traditions, specifically 
traditions regarding land-holdings.  Jordan has been relatively 
successful in balancing Bedouin ambitions of retaining traditional 
cultural and political forms, as well as the right of the state to regulate 
the allocation of land and to pursue economic development.114 The 
comparison with Jordan, an Arab state of Bedouin origin, illustrates the 
extent at which politics, ideology, and ethnicity are entwined in this 
territorial conflict in Israel.  Due to this sensitive and pragmatic conflict, 
a resolution needs to derive from an interest-based dialogue, rather than 
on penalties and politicization. 
 
                                                          
114.  Id. 
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